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This Article argues that the lands set aside for Alaska Natives by
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA") are tribal
territory, or "Indian country," and are therefore subject to the
exercise of tribal sovereign powers The Article first discusses
some basic Indian law tenets, which it draws upon throughout its
analysis. Next, the Article gives an overview of the history of the
Indian country concept, concluding that courts other than the
United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals have been reluctant to acknowledge the existence of
Indian country in Alaska The Article then argues that the
"dependent Indian community," a category of Indian country, has
been defined by the Supreme Court as a broad catch-all category,
which includes all land set aside for the use of Indians who are
under the superintendence of the federal government. Finally, the
Article concludes tha4 contrary to the 1995 district court opinion
in Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School District v. Native Village
of Venetie, which ignores basic federal Indian law tenets and the
federal government's self-determination policy with regard to
Alaska Natives, ANCSA corporation lands are dependent Indian
communities
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act' ("ANCSA")
conveyed approximately forty-four million acres of federal lands to
Native corporations created pursuant to ANCSA.2 About half of
the land was conveyed to more than 200 village corporations and
the remainder was distributed among thriteen regional corpora-
tions.3  As Alaska Native tribal entities attempt to assert tribal
sovereign powers, these corporation lands may be at the center of
a struggle. The existence of tribal territory, known as "Indian
country," is essential for any meaningful exercise of tribal sovereign
powers. If ANCSA corporation lands constitute Indian country,
then a significant portion of Alaska may be subject to the exercise
of tribal sovereign powers, and the exercise of the State's sovereign
powers may be somewhat limited! Consequently, whether
ANCSA corporations lands constitute Indian country is a matter of
great concern to Alaska Native tribal entities and to the State of
Alaska.5
1. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-28 (1988). ANCSA is a settlement of Alaska Native
aboriginal rights. The act extinguished all aboriginal land claims, aboriginal fishing
and hunting rights and all but one of the Native reservations existing in Alaska.
In return, Alaska Natives, via stock ownership in newly created ANCSA
corporations, received fee title to approximately 44 million acres and monetary
compensation of about $962.5 million. Id.
2. Id § 1611(b), (c).
3. Id.
4. See generally FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
349-79 (1982 ed.). Alaska is one of six states characterized as a mandatory Public
Law 280 state. Public Law 280 grants the six states criminal and civil jurisdiction
over Indian country within their respective boundaries. Act of Aug. 15,1953, Pub.
L. No. 83-280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588 (1953). However, this grant does not encompass
regulatory law, so determinations about Indian country will have the greatest effect
with regard to the regulatory powers of the state and Alaska Native tribal entities.
See generally Susanne Di Pietro, Tribal Court Jurisdiction and Public Law 280:
What Role for Tribal Courts in Alaska? 10 ALASKA L. REv. 335 (1993) (exploring
the legal effects of Public Law 280 on tribal court jurisdiction in Alaska).
5. The State has already drawn the battle lines. A confrontation between the
Attorney General of Alaska and the Alaska State House and Senate Judiciary
Committee was reported in the FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS MINER, Dec. 5, 1995,
at Al. The article indicated that the House and Senate Committee was upset that
the Attorney General had recently declined to appeal a federal district court
decision holding that Alaska Native villages are recognized tribes based upon their
inclusion on a 1993 list of Native entities in Alaska published by the Secretary of
the Interior. In response to the criticism, the Attorney General indicated that
although the administration was willing to concede tribal recognition, it was
unwilling to accept the existence of Indian country in Alaska. Id.
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The United States Congress, by statute, has recognized three
categories of Indian country: reservations, Indian allotments and
dependent Indian communities. 6 The creation of reservations and
Indian allotments requires that specific actions be taken by the
federal government.7 Once those actions are taken, there is little
question that a reservation or an Indian allotment has been
established. On the other hand, the dependent Indian community
appears to be a catch-all category of Indian country that is applied
to lands that have certain characteristics similar to those of
reservations and Indian allotments. ANCSA corporations lands are
neither reservations nor Indian allotments; however, depending on
the analysis employed, they may constitute dependent Indian
communities.
This Article will address the application of the Indian country
concept to Alaska, and in particular it will focus on ANCSA
corporation lands. Part II will consider general Indian law
principles. Part III will discuss the historical development of the
Indian country concept in general and as it is applied to Alaska.
Part IV will provide an in-depth analysis of the development of the
dependent Indian community category of Indian country. Part V
will discuss the application of dependent Indian community status
to ANCSA corporation lands8
II. BASIC FEDERAL INDIAN LAW CONCEPTS
Federal Indian law has developed basic tenets that need to be
applied when analyzing specific Indian law concepts. Application
of these tenets often results in conclusions that would not be
reached otherwise.
Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs.9 Although
early cases suggested that "plenary" means "absolute" in the sense
that Congress's dealings with Indians are free from constitutional
restraints, today, Congress's powers over Indians are viewed as
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
7. Reservations have been created by treaties, executive orders and acts of
Congress. In each of these instances, there is a formal declaration that an Indian
reservation is being created. The creation of Indian allotments was authorized by
the Dawes Act, Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), and followed specific federal
regulations.
8. In the contiguous United States, America's indigenous people are all
Indians. In Alaska, indigenous people may be Indian or Eskimo. Consequently,
in Alaska indigenous people as a whole are referred to as Natives. This article
will use the terms "Native(s)" and "Indian(s)" interchangeably.
9. Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977).
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extremely broad but subject to limitations. ° One source of these
limitations is the federal government's trust/guardianship relation-
ship with Indians." The trust obligation requires Congress's
authority over Indians to be exercised in a manner that will protect
Indians. 2 Furthermore, the trust obligation has given rise to the
development of several canons of construction based on the
presumption that Congress's intent toward Indians is benevolent. 3
These canons of construction, primarily developed by courts in the
context of construing Indian treaties, require treaties to be liberally
interpreted in favor of the Indians, ambiguous terms to be resolved
in favor of -the Indians and treaties to be construed as the Indians
would have understood them. 4 While these rules were developed
in the treaty context, all but the rule regarding interpreting treaties
as the Indians would have understood them have been extended to
the non-treaty context, including statutes, agreements and executive
orders.'
Although tribes and their sovereign powers are subordinate to
the federal government, tribal sovereign powers are characterized
as inherent. Consistent with its plenary authority over Indians,
Congress has the power to extinguish tribal sovereign powers.
However, tribes retain those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn
by treaty, statute or by implication as a necessary result of a tribe's
dependent status.' Furthermore, diminution of tribal rights and
powers is not to be inferred from acts of Congress; for tribal
powers to be diminished by congressional action, there must be a
clear and plain expression of congressional intent to do so. 8
In summary, federal Indian law tenets provide that tribal
sovereign powers are inherent powers. When determining what
powers tribes possess, one should start with the full complement of
sovereign powers and then ascertain which powers have been
removed by implication of the dependent status of tribes, or by the
clear and plain intent of a U.S. treaty or statute. In determining
the intent of a treaty or statute, ambiguities are to be resolved in
10. COHEN, supra note 4, at 217.
11. The trust/guardianship relationship was first recognized in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831), and has since become a major underpinning of Indian
policy.
12. COHEN, supra note 4, at 220.
13. l at 221-22.
14. L at 222.
15. Id. at 224.
16. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).
17. 1&t at 323.
18. COHEN, supra note 4, at 224.
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favor of tribal interests, and the content of such documents are to
be liberally construed in the light most favorable to tribal interests.
III. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN
COUNTRY CONCEPT
In order to determine whether a particular area should be
classified as Indian country, it is useful to examine the development
and use of the term "Indian country" through the course of U.S.
history. It is also instructive to examine the application of the term
in the Alaskan context.
The term "Indian country" and the concept of tribal jurisdic-
tional territory appears to have originated with the Proclamation of
1763 issued by King George III of England." The proclamation
established a boundary line between the lands of the Indians and
those of the colonists. After the Revolutionary War, this policy of
separating lands was continued by the newly formed United States.
As Indian lands were encroached upon to a greater and greater
extent, Congress enacted the Trade and Intercourse Act of 179602
The Act set out a north-south boundary between tribal lands to the
west and land open to settlement to the east. This Act was
recodified in 1799,2' and again in 1802,' with little revision
regarding the boundary lines.' While these successive acts used
the term "Indian country," the term was used interchangeably with
other terms such as "Indian town," "Indian settlement," "Indian
territory," and "lands to which the Indian title has not been
extinguished."'24 The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834
statutorily defined Indian country for the first time,26 defining it
as
that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not
within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of
Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the
19. For a more detailed discussion of the early history and development of the
term Indian country, see Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of
Venetie Tribal Gov't, No. F87-0051 CV (HRH), 22 Indian L. Rep. 3267, 3267-68
(D. Alaska, Aug. 2, 1995).
20. Ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469 (1796); see also Native Village of Venetie, 22 Indian L.
Rep. at 3268.
21. Ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743 (1799).
22. Ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139 (1802).
23. Native Village of Venetie, 22 Indian L. Rep. at 3268.
24. COHEN, supra note 4, at 29.
25. Ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
26. CoHEN, supra note 4, at 29.
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Mississippi river, and not within any state[,]27 which the Indian
title has not been extinguished ....
This Act included provisions for federal jurisdiction over
crimes, liquor traffic and other activities taking place in Indian
country.29 The Act's definition of Indian country was predicated
on the then-existing policy of maintaining a separation between
Indians and whites by moving Indians westward. However, this
policy was made impractical by the acquisition of western territories
resulting from the Mexican War. Consequently, the United States
began to locate Indians on tribal reservations within organized
states and territories. Thus, by 1874, the statutory definition of
Indian country had become obsolete, and the definition was
effectively repealed when the compilers of the Revised Statutes
omitted the definition from the Indian Trade and Intercourse
Act.30
With the repeal of the Indian country definition and the
absence of any congressional action to establish a new one, the task
of defining Indian country fell upon the courts. Between 1874 and
1913, the concept of Indian country remained ill-defined. Then, in
1913 and 1914, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the cases of
Donnelly v. United States, United States v. Sandoval and
United States v. Pelican.33 In Donnelly, the Supreme Court held
that an Indian reservation set aside from the public domain by an
executive order was Indian country.34 In Sandoval, the Court held
that communal lands possessed in fee simple (characterized by the
Court as "dependent Indian communities") by the Pueblo tribe was
Indian country.3 In Pelican, the Court held that Indian allot-
ments held in trust by the United States were Indian country.36
Thus, by 1914, there were three distinct categories of Indian
country: Indian reservations, dependent Indian communities and
Indian allotments. In 1948, Congress relied on these three
Supreme Court decisions, along with the subsequent case United
27. The bracketed comma was implied by the Supreme Court in Bates v. Clark,
95 U.S. 204 (1877).
28. Ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
29. COHEN, supra note 4, at 31.
30. Id.
31. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
32. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
33. 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
34. Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 269.
35. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 48.
36. Pelican, 232 U.S. at 449.
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States v. McGowan,37 to define Indian country statutorily as
consisting of Indian reservations, dependent Indian communities
and Indian allotments.38 In reference to Congress's reliance on
these four cases, Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law,
which is considered the authoritative source on federal Indian
law,39 states that Congress's intent "was to designate as Indian
country all lands set aside by whatever means for the residence of
tribal Indians under federal Xrotection, together with trust and
restricted Indian allotments." This statutory definition of Indian
country remains in effect today.
From the time the United States acquired Alaska, courts other
than the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals have demonstrated a great reluctance to acknowledge
the existence of tribes or Indian country in Alaska.41 In 1872, just
four years after the United States acquired Alaska, and while the
definition of Indian country contained in the Indian Intercourse
Act of 1834 was still in effect, Judge Deady of the District Court of
Oregon declared in United States v. Sevelof- 2 that the Act did not
apply to Alaska and that Alaska was not Indian country.43
Seveloff involved the trafficking of liquor, an activity regulated in
Indian country by the Indian Intercourse Act of 1834.' Ignoring
an Attorney General's formal advisory opinion,45 Judge Deady
characterized the Indian Intercourse Act as a "local act" that did
not apply to territories subsequently acquired by the United States,
37. 302 U.S. 535 (1938) (characterizing the Reno Indian colony as a dependent
Indian community and therefore Indian country).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). This statute appears in the federal criminal code.
However, in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975), the
Supreme Court indicated that this definition generally applies to questions of
federal civil jurisdiction and tribal jurisdiction.
39. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERCAN JuSTICE, at ix (1983)(referring to Cohen's Handbook as "the classic
treatise on Indian rights"). For a brief discussion of Cohen's scholarship, see
CHARLES F. WILKiNSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 57-59 (1987).
40. CoHEN, supra note 4, at 34.
41. For an in-depth discussion of early judicial treatment of the Indian country
issue in Alaska, see Sidney L. Harring, The Incorporation of Alaskan Natives
Under American Law: United States and Tlingit Sovereignty, 1867-1900, 31 ARz.
L. REv. 279 (1989).
42. 1 Alaska Fed. 64 (1872).
43. Id
44. Ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
45. 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 295 (1855).
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and thus concluded that "the Territory of Alaska is not a part of
'the Indian country' .... ,46
In a reaction to Judge Deady's decision, Congress amended the
Indian Intercourse Act to include Alaska as Indian country for
purposes of the liquor trafficking provisions.47 Furthermore, in
response to an inquiry from Secretary of War William Belknap,
Attorney General George Williams issued an opinion stating
that Alaska was Indian country and the liquor trafficking provisions
were to be enforced by the War Department.49  This apparent
rebuff by the federal government did not deter Judge Deady from
pursuing his agenda against recognizing Indian country in Alaska.
In several subsequent opinions, Judge Deady continued to
undermine the recognition of Indian country in Alaska, and he has
been credited as having "singlehandedly determined the legal status
of Alaska natives with a series of rulings inconsistent with both
existing federal Indian policy and with the actual intent of the
Department of the Interior regarding the legal status of Alaska
natives. '175
Judge Deady's decisions resulted in the general belief that
Indian country did not exist anywhere in Alaska.5' During the
first half of the twentieth century this belief persisted, and the
question of whether Indian country existed in Alaska did not
surface in the judicial arena. Then, in 1957, the issue arose again
in the case of In re McCord."2 By this time, the three-category
46. Seveloff, 1 Alaska Fed. at 67-70.
47. Harring, supra note 41, at 286.
48. 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 327 (1873).
49. Id
50. Id. at 326.
51. The existence of this general belief is best illustrated by the political
response to In re McCord, 151 F.Supp. 132 (D. Alaska 1957), eighty-five years
later. The decision instigated a flourish of correspondence between Territorial
Representative Bob Bartlett, Executive Director of the Alaska Legislative Council
Henry J. Camarot, the Treasurer of the Territory Hugh Wade and attorney for the
Department of Interior, Walter Walsh. The gentlemen feared the McCord
decision, which declared Tyonek, Alaska to be Indian country, In re McCord, 151
F. Supp. at 135, would open the door for other Alaska Native communities to
declare themselves outside the territorial government's jurisdiction. Due to Judge
Deady's 1872 decision, this was not an issue prior to McCord. See Personal
Correspondence of Bob Bartlett, Territorial Representative (May 24,1957 - Aug.
6, 1957) (on file with the Bartlett Collection Archive, University of Alaska
Fairbanks). See generally David M. Blurton & Gary D. Copus, Administering
Criminal Justice in Remote Alaska Native Villages: Problems and Possibilities, 11
N. REv. YUKON C. 118, 122-25 (Winter 1993).
52. 151 F. Supp. 132 (D. Alaska 1957).
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statutory definition of Indian country existed 3 The federal
district court for Alaska apparently relied on the dependent Indian
community category to conclude that the Native Village of Tyonek
was Indian countryf In coming to its conclusion, the court
applied a two-part test: the area constituted Indian country if (1)
the area had been set aside from the public domain and dedicated
to the use of Indians and (2) within the area an operational tribal
government existed. This decision sent shock waves through the
territorial establishment and resulted in Public Law 28056 being
amended in 1958 to grant the territorial government criminal and
civil jurisdiction in Indian country within Alaska.5
In 1958, prior to the amending of Public Law 280, the question
of whether Indian country existed in Alaska was again raised, this
time in regard to the application of criminal jurisdiction. In United
States v. Booth,58 a federal district court judge presiding in Ketch-
ikan, Alaska, held that the Native community of Metlakatla was
not Indian country 9 This case in particular demonstrates the
pervasive judicial mind-set against the existence of Indian country
in Alaska. Metlakatla is located on the Annette Island Reserve, an
Indian reservation created by an act of Congress. There can be no
question that Metlakatla is Indian country because it falls under
"reservations," the first category specified by the statutory
definition of Indian country. Nevertheless, the court disregarded
the reservation status of Metlakatla, and proceeded to apply the
two-part test set out in McCord.' While the court acknowledged
that the area had been set aside for the use of Indians, satisfying
the first part of the McCord test, it concluded that there was not an
operational tribal government.61' In coming to this conclusion, the
53. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
54. In re McCord, 151 F. Supp. at 135.
55. Id.
56. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588 (1953). See
supra, note 4, for discussion of Public Law 280.
57. In 1958, Public Law 280 was amended by Public Law 85-615 to include
Alaska as one of six states granted criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian
country within their respective borders. See Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-
615, 72 Stat. 545 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1984)). For further discussion
of In re McCord and the subsequent efforts to amend Public Law 280, see Blurton
& Copus, supra note 51, at 122-25. During the congressional debate on the
amendment, it was noted that there were possibly more than 200 enclaves of
Indian country in Alaska. Id.
58. 161 F. Supp. 269 (D. Alaska 1958).
59. Id. at 271.
60. Id. at 270; see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
61. Id, at 271.
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court noted that while Metlakatla had a mayor and council, the
community had never had a "chief" or "medicine man," and hence
it had a white man's government rather than the tribal government
required by the second part of the test.6 2
After the amendment of Public Law 280, granting civil and
criminal jurisdiction to the state over Indian country in Alaska, the
issue of Indian country in Alaska remained dormant until the
1980's. In 1988, in the case Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School
District v. Native Village of Venetie, s the issue again arose in the
context of whether certain lands constituted dependent Indian
communities. Before turning to a discussion of this case,' it is
necessary to look at the development of the dependent Indian
community category of Indian country.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEPENDENT INDIAN COMMUNITY
CATEGORY OF INDIAN COUNTRY
Unlike reservations and Indian allotments, which require an
explicit act by the federal government to designate the lands as
such,6' the dependent Indian community category has been used
as a catch-all category initially created and imprecisely defined by
the United States Supreme Court.66 The Supreme Court case of
United States v. Sandoval67 has generally been credited with
creating the dependent Indian community category of Indian
country. In Sandoval, the land in question was owned communally
by the Pueblo tribe in fee simple.' In the New Mexico Enabling
Act,69 Congress had specified that these fee simple Pueblo lands
would constitute Indian country. ° Because the State of New
Mexico was challenging the federal government's jurisdiction over
a criminal prosecution as a usurpation of the state's powers, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the status of the
Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that the land was "Indian
62. Id. at 274.
63. 856 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39, 47 (1913) (lands held
in fee simple by the New Mexico Pueblo Indians under a land grant from the King
of Spain); United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1981) (land
held in trust and used for a housing project for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux);
United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971) (lands that the
Navajo purchased from a private corporation).
67. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
68. Id. at 39.
69. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (1910).
70. Id.; see also Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 36-37.
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country" subject to congressional regulation.7' In arriving at its
decision, the Court focused on two factors: (1) whether Congress
intended the Pueblos to occupy dependent status and (2) whether
the Pueblo land had been set aside for their use. The Supreme
Court noted that "[the Pueblos] have been regarded and treated by
the United States as requiring special consideration and protection,
like other Indian communities."' The federal legislative and
executive branches of government had treated the Pueblos as
dependent Indian communities entitled to aid and protection like
other Indian tribes.73 Consequently, the Pueblos were held to be
a dependent Indian community.74
Although the Supreme Court primarily focused on the
dependent status of the Pueblo tribe, it also noted that the Pueblos
had received their lands as grants from the King of Spain, and that
these grants were later confirmed by the United States when it
acquired the territory from Mexico.75 Additionally, the Court
noted that the lands were held communally by the Pueblos and
were thus akin to public lands of a tribe.76 The Court found that
the Pueblo lands were lands set aside for the use of Indians
(although not set aside by the United States). Because these lands
had been set aside for the use of the Pueblos and they were under
the protection or superintendence of the United States by virtue of
their dependent status, the Court held that the Pueblo lands were
Indian country.7
Just one year after Sandoval, the Supreme Court decided
United States v. Pelican.78 Although Pelican dealt with Indian
allotments rather than dependent Indian communities, it is
instructive with regard to the Supreme Court's beliefs concerning
what constitutes Indian country in general. Pelican raised the issue
of whether an Indian allotment located outside any reservation
boundaries constitutes Indian country.79 Although the Indian
allotments were being held in trust for individual Indians rather
than being owned by or held in trust for tribal communal interests,
the Court characterized Indian allotments as "being devoted to
Indian occupancy under the limitations imposed by federal
71. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 38.
72. Id. at 39.
73. Id. at 47.
74. Id. at 48.
75. Id. at 39.
76. Id. at 48.
77. Id.
78. 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
79. Id. at 445.
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legislation."8 In noting this, the Court indicated that neither the
trust status nor the federal supervision was important in and of
itself; rather each was important as demonstrations of Congress's
intent to provide Indians and their lands with a protected status.81
In concluding that the Indian allotment constituted Indian country,
the Court noted that such "lands remained Indian lands set apart
for Indians under governmental care."'  This case, although
dealing with Indian allotments rather than dependent Indian
communities, is similar to Sandoval in its focus on whether lands
have been set aside for Indians and whether Congress has demon-
strated an intent to provide special protection to the Indians
occupying the lands. Clearly, from these two cases decided one
year apart, it can be seen that the Supreme Court believed the
essence of Indian country was land dedicated to the use of Indians
whom Congress believed needed special consideration or protec-
tion.
More than twenty years after the Sandoval decision, the
Supreme Court once again returned to the dependent Indian
community issue in United States v. McGowan.' At issue was
whether the Reno Indian Colony, consisting of several hundred
Indians living on approximately twenty-eight acres, constituted
Indian country.4 The lands in question had been purchased by
the United States to provide land for needy Indians scattered over
the State of Nevada.85 The lands had not been designated as
either reservations or Indian allotments. In addressing the
character of the lands, the Court stated that it was immaterial
whether Congress had designated the settlement as a reservation or
a colony."5 In either case, the lands had been set aside for Indians
who were under federal government superintendenceY As in
Sandoval and Pelican, the Court in McGowan focused on Con-
gress's intent to provide special protection and consideration for
the Indians occupying the lands in question. The Court noted that
the Indians of the Indian Reno Colony had been afforded the same
protection that was granted to those who lived on reservations."
The Court concluded that the lands thus constituted Indian country.
80. Id. at 449.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
84. Id. at 536.
85. Id. at 537.
86. Id. at 538-39.
87. Id. at 539.
88. Id. at 538.
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These cases show an emerging pattern: in determining
whether lands constitute Indian country, the Supreme Court places
little importance on the manner in which the lands have been set
aside for Indians. Instead, the Court has found the relevant factors
to be whether the lands have been set aside for the use of Indians
and, if so, whether the Indians for whom the land has been set
aside have been recognized by Congress as deserving special
consideration and protection.
Ten years after the McGowan decision, Congress enacted the
present statutory definition of Indian country." As previously
noted,9 the statute relied heavily upon Sandoval, Pelican and
McGowan. In essence, Congress adopted the Supreme Court's
theory regarding which lands should constitute Indian country.
Another issue in regard to Indian country is whether a specific
set of factors should be used by courts to determine whether land
constitutes a dependant Indian community, thus making it Indian
country. Although several circuit courts have applied a specific set
of factors, the Supreme Court has declined to do so in making this
determination.
For example, in Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School District v.
Native Village of Venetie,9' the Ninth Circuit affirmed both the
federal district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against
tribal enforcement of a business activities tax and the court's
refusal to grant a dismissal of the State's claims. 2 In its decision,
the Ninth Circuit indicated that the ultimate outcome of the dispute
was dependent upon the determination of whether the lands upon
which the business activity was conducted were Indian country.9'
The Ninth Circuit indicated that the lower court should apply an94
analysis similar to that used in United States v. Martine4 and
United States v. South Dakota9 to determine whether the lands in
question constituted Indian country, specifically whether the lands
were dependent Indian communities.9?
In Martine, in determining whether certain lands constituted
dependent Indian communities, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial
court's consideration of the following three factors: (1) the nature
of the area; (2) the relationship of the area inhabitants to Indian
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
90. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
91. 856 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1988).
92. Id. at 1391.
93. Id.
94. 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971).
95. 665 F2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981).
96. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d at 1391.
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tribes and the federal government and (3) the established practice
of government agencies toward the area.97 In South Dakota, the
Eighth Circuit, relying in part on Martine and other decisions, set
forth the following factors to be considered: (1) the degree of
federal ownership of and control over the area; (2) the nature of
the area in question, that is, the relationship of the inhabitants of
the area to Indian tribes and to the federal government and the
established practice of government agencies in the area; (3) the
degree of cohesiveness of the area; and (4) the extent to which the
area was set aside for the use, occupancy and protection of the
dependent Indian peoples.98
Thus, the circuit courts developed a precise set of factors to be
considered in determining whether land constitutes a dependent
Indian community. The Supreme Court, however, has declined to
develop a precise set of factors, instead relying on an expansive
interpretation of what constitutes Indian country. Subsequent to
the enactment of the statutory definition of Indian country in 1948,
the Supreme Court has twice returned to the Indian country issue
and made pronouncements pertinent to the determination of
dependent Indian community status. In 1978, the Supreme Court,
in United States v. John,99 reviewed the status of lands in Miss-
issippi occupied by the remaining members of the Choctaw
Tribe." ° The majority of the tribe had been removed to Oklaho-
ma, but a number of individual Choctaw members had elected to
stay behind in Mississippi."3 In concluding that the land in
question was Indian country, the Court cited United States v.
Pelican"° as indicating that the principal test for determining
whether land constitutes Indian country is whether the land has
been set apart for the use of Indians under the superintendence of
the federal government."3 While several circuit court cases had
suggested using a more technical and limited definition of Indian
country,34 the Court noted that Congress adopted the more
expansive interpretation of Indian country provided by Pelican. 5
The Supreme Court also declined to apply a narrow interpreta-
tion in the 1991 decision Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Potawatomi
97. 442 F2d at 1023.
98. 665 F,2d at 839 (citing Weddel v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211, 213 (8th Cir.
1980)).
99. 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
100. Id. at 636.
101. Id.
102. 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
103. John, 437 U.S. at 650.
104. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
105. John, 437 U.S. at 650 n.18.
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Indian Tribe."6 Instead, the Court returned to the very broad
analysis it first applied in Pelican,'°7 suggesting it prefers the
broad, imprecise definition of dependent Indian community."'a
The Court addressed the Indian country issue with regard to
whether a tribal store that was operated on land held in trust for
the tribe, but was not designated as a reservation, was exempt from
state sales taxes on cigarettes."°  As in Pelican," the Court
indicated that it was immaterial whether Congress had designated
the lands as trust lands rather than reservation lands."' Instead,
the question was whether the land had been validly set apart for
the use of Indians under the superintendence of the federal
government." As it had consistently done for nearly a quarter
of a century when addressing the Indian country issue, the Supreme
Court merely looked at whether the land had been set aside for the
use of Indians and whether the Indians in question had been
recognized for special consideration or protection.
Whether land has been designated as a reservation, Indian
allotment, trust or even fee simple land, the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized such land as Indian country if the land has
been set aside for the use of Indians who are under federal
government superintendence. Congress incorporated the Supreme
Court's decisions in providing the present statutory definition for
Indian country."1  Subsequently, the Supreme Court acknow-
ledged that by incorporating its Indian country decisions, Congress
had endorsed its expansive interpretation of what constitutes Indian
country."' The notion that the statutory definition should be
interpreted broadly is bolstered by the application of the Indian law
tenet requiring that acts of Congress dealing with Indians be
interpreted in the manner most favorable to tribes." Because
designating land as Indian country is beneficial to tribes, the
statutory definition of Indian country should be interpreted as
broadly as possible. Keeping this in mind, the statute can be
interpreted as recognizing two precisely identified forms of Indian
country, reservations and Indian allotments, and a third, catch-all
category, the dependent Indian community. The dependent Indian
106. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
107. United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
108. 498 U.S. at 511.
109. L at 507.
110. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
111. 498 U.S. at 511.
112. Md
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994); see supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
114. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 650 (1994).
115. COHEN, supra note 4, at 222.
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community category includes all lands that have been set aside for
the use of Indians who are under the superintendence of the
federal government.
If dependent Indian community is recognized as being a catch-
all category, then two questions remain. First, by whom and in
what way must the lands have been set aside for Indians? Second,
what constitutes superintendence by the federal government? Since
in essence a statute is being interpreted to answer these questions,
the Indian law rules of construction must be employed.' Ambi-
guities are to be resolved in favor of tribal interests, and the statute
should be liberally construed in the light most favorable to tribal
interests."7 Applying these rules of construction to the first
question suggests that the land could have been set aside by anyone
using any realty conveyance that results in the land being set aside
for Indians. This would include the Indians purchasing the land in
fee simple for themselves. It should not matter who set the land
aside for Indians. Nor should it matter whether the land is placed
into fee simple ownership by tribes, held in trust by the United
States for the benefit of tribes, designated a reservation for Indians
or even conveyed in fee simple to a corporation comprised of
Natives.
One caveat to this interpretation is that, except in the case of
Indian allotments, the lands should have been set aside for a group
of Indians rather than for a single Indian or Indian family. While
it can be argued that such a limitation is inconsistent with the
canons of construction, it should be noted that except for Indian
allotments, the Supreme Court has extended Indian country only
to lands set aside for groups of Indians. Furthermore, in San-
doval,"' the Supreme Court's initial dependent Indian community
decision, the Court found it significant that although the land was
owned in fee simple, it was owned communally by the tribe."9
A final consideration for restricting the dependent Indian
community category to lands set aside for groups of Indians is that
the name of the category implies that the land is used by a group
of Indians. A single person or a single family does not constitute
a community. Hence the restriction on the land being set aside for
a group of Indians rather than an individual Indian or Indian family
would be a reasonable interpretation, and it would prevent lands
purchased by Indian individuals for themselves from being
construed as Indian country.
116. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
117. Id.
118. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
119. Id. at 48.
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In answering the second question-what constitutes superinten-
dence by the federal government-rules of construction suggest
superintendence of the Indians should be liberally construed to
include any federal government action that is intended to provide
benefits to Natives on the basis of their Native status. It is
particularly important to use this liberal interpretation because of
the fluctuation of federal policy, toward Natives in the years since
Sandoval, Pelican and Donnelly were decided.
In approximately three quarters of a century, United States
federal Indian law policy has moved from the allotment and
assimilation era, to the Indian reorganization era, to the termina-
tion era and finally to the self-determination era."2 In each of
these eras, distinct policies have prevailed, often representing
extreme changes in policy direction. Presumably, because of the
federal government's guardianship role with regard to tribal
Indians, each policy represents Congress's interpretation of the best
interests of the Indians. In the allotment and assimilation era,
Congress attempted to encourage Indians to adopt white concepts
of land ownership by allotting lands to individual Indians.' The
era represented a belief that the termination of tribal life was
necessary if Indians were to enjoy the benefits of the American
system.'2 When Congress concluded that the allotment and
assimilation policies had resulted in deplorable living conditions for
Indians, it responded by adopting the Indian reorganization policy
with the intent of re-establishing the tribal governments." While
intending to re-establish tribal governments, the implementation of
the Indian reorganization policy was characterized by extensive
supervision of tribal operations by the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs. 4 After only fourteen years of experimentation with tribal
reorganization, Indian policy flip-flopped, and Congress implement-
ed policies intended to terminate tribal existence and the special
relationship between the federal government and Indians."z
After nearly twenty years of pursuing termination, Congress
implemented the self-determination policies, once again intending
120. For a general discussion of the history of U. S. Indian policy, see COHEN,
supra note 4, at 47-206. The allotment and assimilation era prevailed from 1871
to 1928. The Indian reorganization era followed from 1928 to 1942. The
termination era prevailed from 1943 until 1961. Finally, from 1961 to the present,
the self-determination era has prevailed. Id.
121. COHEN, supra note 4, at 131-32.
122. Id. at 131
123. Id. at 144.
124. Id. at 149.
125. Id. at 152.
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to promote the development of tribal governments.1' However,
unlike the earlier Indian reorganization policies, the self-determina-
tion policies emphasized the development of tribal governments
that were relatively free from federal government supervision1z
Thus, since the time when the present definition of Indian
country began to evolve, federal Indian law policy has varied from
policies that viewed Indian ways of life as inferior and were
therefore designed to instruct Indians in the ways of the dominant
American culture, to policies that respect Indian ways of life and
seek to allow tribal groups to develop on their own terms.
Obviously, what constitutes federal government superintendence
varies drastically with the implementation of the different Indian
policies. In the early part of the present century, it was assumed
that Indians needed supervision and instruction in all facets of their
lives. Today, while Congress still maintains its special relationship
with Natives and tribes, superintendence is limited to providing
funding for the development of tribal operations with the ultimate
goal of tribal governments becoming completely self-sufficient.
Consequently, in determining what constitutes superintendence
of Indians for the purpose of determining dependent Indian
community status, any federal provision of services to the Native
group for whom the land has been set aside should qualify as
federal superintendence. If members of a Native group receive
federally funded health benefits on the basis of their Native status,
if the lands of the Native group receive special protection from
taxation because of the lands' relationship to the Natives, if the
operations of the Native group receive special consideration under
federal laws or if the Native group's operations are subjected to
special federal requirements placed upon Native groups, then the
group of Natives should be considered to be under "federal
superintendence."
Thus, by considering more than three-quarters of a century of
consistent United States Supreme Court decisions, the correspond-
ing federal Indian policies for those years and the basic rules of
construction regarding federal Indian law statutes, it can be
determined that dependent Indian communities include any lands
set aside for the use of a group of Natives who are under the
superintendence of the federal government. The lands in question
can be set aside for the use of the Natives by any person or entity,
and by any means, including the issuance of fee simple title in the
name of a Native organization. Federal superintendence may
consist of such things as the provision of health benefits, protection




from taxation and funding of Native operations or businesses, or it
may consist of making Native operations subject to special federal
requirements.
V. APPLICATION OF THE DEPENDENT INDIAN COMMUNITY
ANALYSIS TO ANCSA CORPORATION LANDS
As previously discussed," the Ninth Circuit in Alaska ex rel.
Yukon Flats School District v. Native Village of Venetie 29 indicat-
ed that the district court should apply an analysis similar to that
used by the Eighth Circuit in South Dakota and the Tenth Circuit
in Martine to determine whether the land in question constituted
a dependent Indian community. On remand, the district court, with
Judge Holland presiding, fashioned an analysis considering four
factors extracted from the Martine and South Dakota cases. 3'
Judge Holland concluded that the dispositive issue was whether the
federal government's treatment of the land and tribal members
evinced an intent that the federal government, not the state
government, be the dominant political institution in the area.'
Judge Holland then concluded that the land in question was not set
aside for Natives, and that the federal government had not
expressed an intent that it be the dominant political institution in
the area.' In coming to his decision, Judge Holland relied
heavily on ANCSA.
Subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's Native Village of Venetie
decision, but prior to Judge Holland's decision, the United States
Office of the Solicitor issued an opinion". ("Solicitor's opinion")
indicating that ANCSA corporation lands were not Indian country.
Like Judge Holland's decision, the Solicitor's opinion relied upon
provisions of ANCSA to determine that Congress did not intend
for the lands in question to be dependent Indian communities." 4
Both Judge Holland's case and the Solicitor's opinion appear to
have ignored the basic tenets of Indian law discussed in Part II of
this article.
128. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
129. 856 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1988).
130. Alaska ex reL Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Gov't, No. F87-0051 CV (HRH), 22 Indian L. Rep. 3267, 3272 (D. Alaska, Aug.
2, 1995); see infra note 135 and accompanying text.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 3277-78.
133. Governmental Jurisdiction of Alaska Native Villages over Land and
Nonmembers, Opinions of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, No. M-36,975
(Jan. 11, 1993).
134. Id. at 118.
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Returning to Native Village of Venetie, in reaching its decision
the district court considered the following factors: "(1) the nature
of the area; (2) the relationship of the inhabitants to one another,
to tribes and to the federal government; (3) the extent to which the
inhabitants and Indian tribes of the area are under the superinten-
dence of the federal government; and (4) the extent to which the
area was set aside for the use and occupancy of Indians as
such."'35  According to the court, the purpose of considering
these factors was to help determine whether the federal govern-
ment's superintendence of the Indians using the lands, and the
setting aside of the lands, "evinces an intention that the federal
government, not the state, be the dominant political institution in
the area."'36
Thus, it appears that in determining whether ANCSA
corporation lands are dependent Indian communities, Native Village
of Venetie applies the analysis repeatedly set forth by the Supreme
Court, requiring that the lands be set aside for the use of a group
of Natives who are under the superintendence of the federal
government. However, the decision adds the requirement that the
set-aside and superintendence evince an intent that the federal
government be the dominant political institution in the area. In
announcing this additional requirement, the federal district court
appears to rely on the Solicitor's opinion.'37 If the requirement
of the Solicitor's opinion were based on case law or statutory
precedence, reliance upon the opinion would be justified. How-
ever, the Solicitor's opinion does not provide any case law or
statutory authority for its position. After referring to Martine,
South Dakota and Potawatomi, the Solicitor's opinion concludes
"[t]he ultimate question in each case is whether the particular facts
and circumstances fit within the congressional scheme intended to
protect certain areas under federal and usually tribal control."'38
Both Native Village of Venetie and the Solicitor's opinion
conclude that ANCSA corporation lands were not set aside for
Natives under federal superintendence in a manner that evinces an
intent that the federal government, rather than the State of Alaska,
be the dominant political institution in the area. Native Village of
135. Native Village of Venetie, 22 Indian L. Rep. at 3272.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 3274 n.26 (quoting the Opinions of the Solicitor to the effect that
"the guiding principle that Indian country comprises those lands that Congress
intended, as a general matter, to be beyond the jurisdictional reach of the state
and subject to the primary jurisdiction of the Federal Government and tribes, even
though those lands are geographically within the boundaries of the state").
138. Op. Solicitor at 116.
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Venetie concludes that ANCSA corporation lands were not under
federal superintendence to a degree evincing intent for federal
dominance over such lands'39 and, furthermore, that ANCSA
corporation lands were not lands set aside for Natives." In
finding that ANCSA corporation lands were not under sufficient
federal superintendence to constitute dependent Indian communi-
ties, the federal district court found that ANCSA effected a
significant change in the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and Alaska Natives.'' The court noted that (1) ANCSA
terminated all reservations within Alaska except for the Annette
Island Reservation (2) ANCSA used corporations incorporated
under state law rather than tribal entities as the recipients of the
settlement (3) ANCSA was intended to avoid the creation of new
racially defined institutions and (4) ANCSA was intended to
maximize the participation of Alaska Natives in affecting their
rights and property without creating reservations or a lengthy
wardship or trusteeship." From these facts, the court concluded
that ANCSA represented Congress's belief that Alaska Natives are
no longer incompetents needing federal government supervision
and should be allowed maximum participation in decisions affecting
their lives. Consequently, the court held that the federal
superintendence of Alaska Natives was not sufficient to find that
the ANCSA corporation lands constituted dependent Indian
communities.
Although it found that the federal superintendence of Alaska
Natives was insufficient for ANCSA corporation lands to constitute
dependent Indian communities, the court nevertheless reviewed
whether ANCSA corporation lands were lands set aside for the use
of Natives. Surprisingly, the court concluded that the lands had not
been set aside for the use of Natives.'" In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court emphasized that Congress had chosen corporate
ownership of the lands, a racially neutral form of ownership, and
that no court had held that a federal government fee title convey-
ance of land to a corporation constituted a set aside for Indi-
ans.
145
The reasoning of the Solicitor's opinion is almost identical to
that found in Native Village of Venetie. The opinion relies on
139. 22 Indian L. Rep. at 3277.
140. Id.
141. Id at 3274.
142. Id at 3275.
143. Id at 3276.
144. Id
145. Id at 3277.
1996]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
ANCSA's professed intent not to create permanent or even long-
term federal supervisory control over land owned or occupied by
Native corporations.' The opinion states that Congress did not
create a trust relationship between the federal government and
ANCSA corporations, and therefore ANCSA corporation lands
cannot constitute dependent Indian communities." Like Native
Village of Venetie, the Solicitor's opinion indicates that the ultimate
question in determining whether lands constitute dependent Indian
communities, or Indian country in general, is whether Congress has
indicated an intent that the federal government, rather than the
state, be the dominant authority in the area."
Native Village of Venetie and the Solicitor's opinion are subject
to the same criticisms. In determining what lands constitute
dependent Indian communities, they do not rely upon prior case
law or statutory authority. The two rulings also do not apply the
Indian law canons of construction to determine the appropriate
meaning of the statutorily specified dependent Indian community
category of Indian country. As previously indicated, canons of
construction dictate that Native-specific statutes should be inter-
preted in a manner most favorable to Natives, and ambiguities must
be interpreted in favor of Native interests.149 Not only have the
decision and the opinion not interpreted the statute and its
underlying case law history in a manner favoring Native interests,
they have introduced a requirement that operates to the detriment
of Native interests without having any case law or statutory basis
for so doing. Thus, the analyses developed by Native Village of
Venetie and the Solicitor's opinion do not comport with long-
established federal Indian law practices.
Similarly, the decision and the opinion fail to recognize the
significance of the federal self-determination policy effects on
federal superintendence of Natives. ANCSA, like all federal Indian
legislation, should be interpreted in a manner most favorable to
Native interests, with ambiguities interpreted favorably for Natives.
An additional tenet of federal Indian law is that in order for
Congress to remove tribal powers, it must do so expressly and not
by inference.50 Clearly, ANCSA can be interpreted as a set-
aside for Alaska Natives. In fact, while Native Village of Venetie
interpreted ANCSA corporation lands as not being lands set aside
for Natives, the Solicitor's opinion interpreted ANCSA corporation
146. Op. Solicitor at 119.
147. Id. at 119-20.
148. Id. at 116.
149. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
150. Op. Solicitor at 116.
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lands as, in some respects, having been set aside for Natives.'
Given that the lands were granted as part of a Natives' claim
settlement, it defies logic how ANCSA lands can be anything other
than lands set aside for Native use. Even if Alaska Natives,
through their ANCSA corporations, elected to sell their lands,
ANCSA itself set aside the lands for Natives to use as they wished.
The subsequent sale of the lands by Alaska Natives does not
change the fact that ANCSA set aside the lands for Natives.
Native Village of Venetie and the Solicitor's opinion emphasize
those portions of ANCSA that could be construed against Native
interests while down-playing those aspects that demonstrate federal
superintendence. The decision and opinion rely heavily on
ANCSA's statements regarding its intent not to create reservations
or a lengthy trusteeship. 2 In emphasizing this ANCSA policy
statement, they have ignored the fact that the choice not to use
reservations for ANCSA was proposed and endorsed by the Alaska
Native leadership because of perceived restrictions upon reserva-
tion lands held in trust by the federal government.' Hence, it
was the Alaska Natives' desire to be able to exercise more
authority over their lands, not a desire of the federal government
to terminate its special relationship with Alaska Natives, that was
responsible for the anti-reservation policy of ANCSA. It would be
inappropriate under such circumstances and Indian law canons of
construction to interpret ANCSA in a way that actually reduces
Alaska Natives' powers to regulate their lives and lands.
With regard to the Indian law tenet that Congress must
diminish tribal powers expressly, Native Village of Venetie and the
Solicitor's opinion appear to analyze ANCSA improperly. The
decision and the opinion interpret ANCSA in a manner that almost
completely eliminates significant tribal powers. Consequently, their
interpretation can be correct only if ANCSA or its legislative
history reveals an express intent to diminish tribal powers. Such an
express intent simply does not exist. If anything, ANCSA speaks
about empowering Alaska Natives. Furthermore, Native Village of
Venetie directly violates this tenet. Noting that ANCSA never
refers to Indian country, the court infers a presumption that
Congress knew and intended that ANCSA would change the
balance of power resulting in the diminution of tribal powers."
A final flaw in the reasoning of Native Village of Venetie and
the Solicitor's opinion is the failure to take into account the general
151. ML at 118.
152. See 22 Indian L. Rep. at 3275; see also Op. Solicitor at 119.
153. See Op. Solicitor at 89.
154. Native Village of Venetie, 22 Indian L. Rep. at 3276.
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policy of the Indian self-determination era, the era in which
ANCSA was enacted. As previously mentioned, the Indian self-
determination era, which began around 1961, represents a federal
policy to promote tribal governance.15 The intent of this policy
is to foster tribal decision-making and responsibility and to reduce
the federal government's supervision of Native affairs. Among the
most significant acts of this era is the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act of 1975,156 which professes a
congressional commitment to maintain the federal government's
unique relationship and responsibility with Natives by establishing
Indian self-determination policies that transfer federal domination
of programs and services for Natives to the control of Native
organizations. 57 Native Village of Venetie characterizes ANCSA
as a "new Native self-determination act."'58 It is inconsistent to
view ANCSA as reflecting the policies of the self-determination era
while interpreting it in a manner that severely limits tribal sover-
eign powers. Furthermore, interpreting ANCSA as diminishing
federal superintendence might even result in Indian reservations
losing their Indian country status. This interpretation results in a
diminution of tribal powers, contrary to the intent of the self-
determination policy. Consequently, for purposes of determining
Indian country during the self-determination era, federal superin-
tendence should focus on funding, services and special protection
provided to Natives and their organizations. Superintendence
should not be interpreted as requiring pervasive federal supervision
of Natives and their activities.
Rather than following the analysis of Native Village of Venetie
and the Solicitor's opinion, the analysis for the ANCSA corporation
lands instead should focus on whether the lands have been set aside
for the use of Natives who are under federal superintendence.
With regard to the lands having been set aside for the use of
Natives, the only real question is whether ANCSA corporations
should not be considered a form of Native ownership. While
corporations are generally defined as having personality separate
from their shareholders,' the character of ANCSA corporations
should be viewed in light of ANCSA's special provisions regarding
stock ownership and rights, and also viewed in the context of the
self-determination era. ANCSA restricted the initial issuance of
155. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
156. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, 455-458e (1994).
157. IL §§ 450-450a.
158. 22 Indian L. Rep. at 3275.
159. Eagle Air, Inc. v. Corroon & Black/Dawson & Co. ofAlaska, Inc., 648 P.2d
1000, 1003 (Alaska 1982).
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ANCSA stock to Alaska Natives.'" ANCSA also provided that
ANCSA corporations have the right to purchase ANCSA shares
that have been acquired by non-Natives through intestate succes-
sion. 6 ' Additionally, a twenty year stock alienation prohibition
was included in ANCSA, and it was extended indefinitely by
amendment. 62 Clearly, ANCSA evinces an intent that ANCSA
corporations remain under control of Alaska Natives.
The Supreme Court decisions that formed the basis for the
statutory definition of Indian country, as well as the recent
Supreme Court decisions regarding Indian country, consistently
indicate that the manner in which the federal government sets land
aside for Indians is not important. Thus, lands characterized as
communal fee lands, trust lands, Indian colonies and reservations
have all been accorded Indian country status. The majority of
these land set-asides occurred prior to the Native self-determination
era, and consequently incorporated a great deal of federal control.
ANCSA, as a self-determination era act, should not be expected to
incorporate such federal control. Conveyance of Native set-aside
lands to Native controlled corporations is in keeping with the self-
determination era and can be characterized as a form of communal
ownership. Thus, lands conveyed to ANCSA corporations should
be viewed as lands set aside for the use of Indians.
With regard to the superintendence issue, the question is
whether the federal government provides sufficient funding,
services and special protection to Alaska Natives for the Natives to
qualify as being under superintendence for Indian country pur-
poses. ANCSA provides special protection to Alaska Natives. As
already mentioned, ANCSA attempts to protect Native ownership
of ANCSA corporations by restricting stock alienation and through
special provisions concerning stock acquired by non-Natives
through intestate succession. ANCSA also provides tax protection
for undeveloped corporation lands."6' Aside from special consid-
erations provided by ANCSA, Alaska Natives receive special
consideration for aid to small businesses," Native alcohol and
substance abuse prevention and treatment,'" child welfare
payments,"6 tribal health care grants and contracts 67 and many
160. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1604(b), 1606(g)(1)(A), 1607(c) (1994).
161. Id § 1606(h)(2).
162. Id. § 1606(h)(1).
163. Id. § 1620(d).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 637 (1994).
165. 25 U.S.C. § 2401-55 (1994).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 628 (1994).
167. 25 U.S.C. § 1644 (Supp. 1996).
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other federal programs. In fact, a federal Indian law text dealing
with Alaska Natives indicates that "since 1971, there has been a
veritable explosion of statutory provisions specifying Alaska
Natives as the beneficiaries of federal Native American pro-
grams." This ample federal support provided to Alaska Natives
on the basis of their Native status suggests that federal superinten-
dence of Alaska Natives is as strong as ever. It also necessitates
the conclusion that ANCSA corporation lands are lands that have
been set aside for the use of Natives who are under federal
superintendence. Thus, ANCSA corporation lands should be
considered dependent Indian communities.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Alaska, there has been a long history of courts and other
agencies resisting the recognition of Indian country. While it is
certainly possible to characterize ANCSA as not intending to create
Indian country in the form of ANCSA corporation lands, the
consistent treatment of the dependent Indian community category
by Supreme Court cases, the federal Indian law tenets and the self-
determination era policies dictate otherwise. ANCSA must be
viewed in the manner most favorable to Native interests. Absent
express intent, ANCSA should not be interpreted in a manner that
diminishes tribal sovereign powers. It must be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the underlying policies of the self-determi-
nation era to promote Native self-government. Since the Supreme
Court cases establishing the dependent Indian community category
have been incorporated into the federal statutory definition of
Indian country, the concepts developed by them should be viewed
in the manner most beneficial to Native interests. In consideration
of these factors, it seems appropriate that ANCSA corporation
lands be considered lands set aside for Natives who are under
federal superintendence.
168. DAVID S. CASE, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 22 (1978).
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